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Joseph Margolis* 
Richard Rorty Contra Rorty and John Dewey
Abstract: Dewey’s concept of “experience” has bafled many a reader. It is, however, 
assuredly the key to Dewey’s distinctive philosophical contribution. Notoriously, 
Rorty urges that Dewey would have been well-advised to abandon “experience: 
in favor of “discourse” (that is, the “linguistic method of philosophy”), which he 
draws largely from Davidson and Sellars. For various reasons, Rorty betrays his 
deep misunderstanding of Dewey’s pragmatism, the lack of any close relationship 
between Sellars’s notion of the “given” (as a philosophical target) and Dewey’s 
notion of the saving discovery of what is “denoted” (in inquiry) as the “given”; 
and the extremely problematic (possibly even incoherent) treatment of linguistic 
meaning in Davidson’s most pertinent papers (which Rorty seems to regard as 
pragmatist in an important sense and is guided by). In any event, neither Davidson 
nor Rorty can be rightly supposed to extend or improve Deweyan pragmatism: 
Rorty, in fact, explicitly and unconditionally repudiates the “linguistic turn”; 
and Davidson inally subverts the very theory of language on which any reading 
of Rorty’s “pragmatist” account of Davidson’s theory of meaning would be 
at all feasible. The exposé of these disorders may contributes to a more careful 
formulation of the pragmatist undertaking, which lies elsewhere and depends on a 
measure of convergence between Dewey and Peirce.
I
The opening chapters of John Dewey’s Logic and Experience and Nature are, 
arguably, the most important and strategic of Dewey’s entire output: the irst chapter 
of the Logic is bafling and the matching chapter of Experience and Nature, meant, 
plausibly, to range over the same conceptual terrain, is hard to reconcile, textually, with 
its companion in the Logic. Notoriously, Richard Rorty, who claims to be an admirer 
of Dewey’s, reads Experience and Nature as conirming that there’s no need for any 
metaphysics, and, against both books, advises that Dewey should have rejected the 
primacy of his doctrine of “experience” (which draws courage from William James’s 
remarkably expansive use of the same concept, in Essays in Radical Empiricism), and 
should have relied instead on linguistically explicit propositions (“discourse”), which 
strikes me as incoherent. The most sustained – oblique – version of Rorty’s argument 
appears in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature; a narrower argument, speciically 
directed against Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology in Experience and Nature, 
appears in Rorty’s “Dewey’s Metaphysics”1.
* Temple University [josephmargolis455@hotmail.com]
1. See Rorty (1979: Introduction and Part Three); and Rorty (1982: “Dewey’s Metaphysics”). See, 
also, the well-known second sentence (regarding “experience”) in “Inquiry as recontextualization: An 
anti-dualist account of interpretation”, in Rorty (1991: 93). (The essay seems to have been written in, 
or somewhat before, 1988.)
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But, to my mind, it’s Rorty’s failure to engage Dewey’s account of “experience” 
(in the Logic) – an admittedly exotic, idiosyncratic, blunderbuss of a notion – and 
his failure to examine the common ground of the opening chapters of the two books, 
with regard to their shared theme, that is more troublesome. Because, lacking such an 
effort, Rorty’s advice is never really grounded pertinently – and must seem, to any 
ordinarily careful reader, to be completely wide of the mark and (as I say) incoherent 
on its face.
I’m not persuaded that Dewey’s account in the Logic (or what of it is implicated 
in the irst chapter of Experience and Nature) is entirely felicitous – or compelling; 
although its thrust and originality are straightforward enough and relatively 
uncontroversial (once rightly grasped). It’s not an easy task, however, to render a 
transparent formula of what Dewey means by “experience”, “metaphysics”, and “the 
method of denoting”, by the use of which he circumscribes his undertaking. The best 
brief statement of Dewey’s metaphysics, which Rorty cites (which Arthur Murphy 
had already cited in his contribution to the Schilpp volume) runs this way:
This is the extent and method of my metaphysics [Dewey afirms, in an earlier paper]: 
the large and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures and 
successes together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics and religion 
which mark them, communicate genuine features of the world within which man lives.2
Murphy rightly thinks this “method” (said to be “empirical” or responsive to 
“experience”) is not likely “to provide the ‘inal explanation’ or ‘a unique approach 
to reality’” (Murphy 1951: 218). But then Murphy actually seems to favor Dewey’s 
avoidance of an ultimate metaphysics: Dewey positively wants a blunderbuss 
solution, though an answer grounded at both ends of an “inquiry”, so to say – that is, 
“denotatively” and in terms of scientiic testing, in any pertinently initial “experience” 
and in any subsequent interpretation of it that we undertake. Whatever bears on human 
life (in this sense) is welcome, since it is as reliably “given”, discerned, or “denoted” 
in any humanly inhabited world, as anything claiming evidential standing:
Man fears because he exists in a fearful, an awful world. The world is precarious 
and perilous. It is as easily accessible and striking evidence of this fact that primitive 
experience is cited. The voice is that of early man; but the hand is that of nature, the 
nature in which we still live. (Dewey 1981: 43-4)
The traits possessed by the subject-matters of experience are as genuine as the 
characteristics of sun and electron. They are found, experienced, and are not to be 
shoved out of being by some trick of logic. When found, their ideal qualities are as 
relevant to the philosophical theory of nature as are the traits found by physical inquiry. 
(Dewey 1981: 14)
As far as I can see, Dewey simply means to feature, in the most informal and 
tolerant way, the continuity and contrast between what he calls “gross, macroscopic, 
2. Dewey, “Half-Hearted Naturalism” (1927: 59); cited in Murphy, “Dewey’s Epistemology and 
Metaphysics”, in Schilpp (1951: 217); and in Rorty’s “Dewey’s Metaphysics” (1982: 73).
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crude subject-matters in primary experience and the reined, derived objects of 
[scientiic and technical] relection” (Dewey 1981: 15 ff.). It also explains the otherwise 
puzzling account of (what he calls) “inquiry” (in the Logic) and the features of an 
“indeterminate situation” (Dewey 1938: 104-5). Dewey simply ascribes (“mythically”, 
let us say) psychological and anthropomorphized properties to bio-cultural, holist, 
even precognitive “situations” in which speciically human interests and responses 
are said to take form from initially inchoate organismic processes, in which the 
familiar determinacies of subjective and objective presence and functionality cannot 
yet be posited. The principal purpose of this way of speaking is, apparently, to insure 
(awkwardly, it must be said) the reality of the human world at its most elemental 
(“primary experience”); the characterization of the language of determinate subjects 
and objects as thoroughly (but never more than) instrumental and provisional, apt for 
the resolution of diverse and adventitious goals; and, also, the continuum of the world 
shared by “primary experience” and a disciplined science.
What Dewey says here is remarkably unguarded. He treats the “macroscopic” order 
of human “sufferings [and] enjoyments” as “given” (“denoted”), without any need for 
ine-grained conirmation beyond the “crude” determinacies of what creatures endure 
(“ind”) in “primary experience” (which may, in fact, depend as much on noncognitive 
[sic] as on cognized “experience”). Dewey’s insistence is meant to be existential, 
in the sense in which, regarding primary experience, there can be no tribunal but 
the testimony of the human creature that endures – and that conirms the pertinence 
of whatever is judged to serve as the resolution of a risked “inquiry”: the outcome, 
beyond the precision of any mediating science, cannot be more than “warrantedly 
assertible”. (“True” is itself restricted to whatever plays no more than a mediating 
role.) Note, please, that metaphysics and epistemology must, then, trail off into the 
vagaries of organismic life: the precision of logic and science is itself no more than 
approximative and informal, being instrumental inally to the transient goals of the 
same inquiry that invites their subaltern precision. I venture to say that Rorty has no 
inkling of such innovations – and no interest in their philosophical possibilities. But it 
is indeed this slim discovery that I deem houses the best prophecy about pragmatism’s 
larger prospects within the future of Western philosophy.
One may be pardoned, therefore, if one inds oneself bewildered by Rorty’s 
apparent effort to defeat or deform any plausible reading of Dewey’s undertaking. We 
cannot easily say (if we accept Rorty’s loose charges) what we should understand by 
the philosophical program or movement called “pragmatism”; or what Dewey may 
be rightly said to have accomplished; or indeed in what sense igures like Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Davidson, Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom may (or may not) be 
reasonably regarded as pragmatists themselves, in the strongest possible sense of the 
term – especially when judged with an eye to the movement’s future and in accord 
with Rorty’s habit of regarding these somewhat unlikely igures (and a good many 
others whom he mentions) as distinctly potent pragmatists3.
3. See, for instance, the igures Rorty collects as “pragmatists” in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
“Introduction” and Chapter 7. 
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My charge against Rorty, quite simply, is that his dismissive judgments are often 
irresponsible (if we credit Dewey’s bona ides at all) or, worse, are no more than potted 
versions of his dismissal of canonical philosophy itself. The fact remains that Dewey 
never intended to reject metaphysics or epistemology (as Rorty more than insinuates) 
and that, at the same time – to judge, hardly unfairly, from what I’ve already cited – 
Dewey’s pronouncements on both disciplines are meant to assign them no more than 
an instrumental, provisionally mediating role within the span of inquiry itself, within 
the approximate boundaries of “indeterminate” and “determinate” situations. I think 
this is characteristic of Dewey’s opposition to canonical (so-called “spectatorial”) 
philosophy (prone to generating telltale “dualisms”) and his treatment of the otherwise 
puzzling priorities involving the division of labor (central to the Logic) of the eminent 
functions of those strategically contrasted terms, “truth” and “warranted assertibility” 
– assigning primacy to the latter (in the instrumental judgments of a running inquiry) 
over “truth” (restricted to the seeming invariances of propositionalized assertions 
serving conventional logic and conventional science). This is the obvious point of the 
well-known remark, near the beginning of the Logic:
The theory [of Logic], in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their 
characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with 
control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions...Inquiry is the life-blood of 
every science and is constantly employed in every art, craft and profession. In short, the 
hypothesis represents a vera causa, no matter what doubt may attend its applicability in 
the ield of logic. (Dewey 1938: 4)
Dewey’s entire project is to embed the seemingly autonomous work of canonical 
logic and science completely, in the instrumentalist way, within the continuum of 
“inquiry” – in accord with the notorious, but now relatively straightforward precept 
(controversial, though it must remain):
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into 
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a uniied whole. (Dewey 1938: 104 ff.)
Now, then, “experience”, in Dewey’s usage (following James) applies in an 
unlimited variety of ways to every phase of “inquiry” thus construed: so that, for 
instance, it applies to “nature” as well as to “experience” (in any psychologistic 
or mentalistic or rationalist sense), and to nonconscious and “noncognitive” 
(“organismic”, inchoate) forms of animal responsiveness as well as to the fully 
cognitive, discursive, deliberately “controlled” interventions of science.
Given Dewey’s ingenious terms (sometimes awkwardly and less than helpfully 
expressed), this “empirical method” insures the essentially instrumental (or passingly 
adequate) standing of any would-be substantive metaphysics and epistemology, the 
effective “givenness” of “primary experience” (in some tolerant sense grounded in 
whatever we ind effectively “denoted” within a “problematic situation”), however 
caught up, mediatingly, by the provisional ixities of canonical logic and science: 
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themselves ultimately subject to being “tested” by returning to the now-transformed, 
derivative (but not formally inferred) “situation” in which the existential core concerns 
of humans are always irst discerned. If this is a fair rendering of Dewey’s thesis – say, 
the primacy of “warranted assertibility” over “truth” – then, certainly, Rorty is wildly 
off the mark in characterizing Dewey’s pragmatism, as well as in characterizing 
pragmatism in the large (drawn, congruently, from all the classic igures). Here, my 
own interest in the agon has it that Rorty not only misreads Dewey, ignores the deeper, 
genuinely important convergence between Dewey and Charles Peirce, fails to see 
that the penetrating import of Dewey’s application of James’s suggestive (more than 
problematic) use of James’s own notion of “experience” eclipses the oddly detached 
treatment of “experience” in Radical Empiricism. (The importance of James’s intuition 
can only be recovered through a labor like Dewey’s: James’s contribution is, as we say, 
proleptic.)
But, now, on my reading, Dewey’s contribution is itself distinctly supportive and 
supplementary to the dawning power of Peirce’s last phase of philosophical invention 
– what I call Peirce’s “abductive turn”, which, in the last decade or so of Peirce’s life, 
begins to replace (for pertinent reasons) Peirce’s own, best known ininitist reading 
of his classic form of fallibilism. I’m quite convinced, now, that Peirce perseverated 
much too long with the ininitist doctrine, though he characteristically cast the thesis 
in the form of rational Hope, not truth, and not in any explicitly transcendental or 
apriorist way.
On the contrary, Peirce seems to have been opposed to Kant’s apriorism almost 
from the beginning of his “career”, possibly as early as 1859 but certainly already in 
the 1860s 4. Peirce says, quite marvelously, rather late in his career:
Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist. A 
real is anything that is not affected by men’s cognitions about it; which is a verbal 
deinition, not a doctrine. An external object is anything that is not affected by any 
cognitions, whether about it or not, of the man to whom it is external. Exaggerate this, 
in the usual philosophical fashion, and you have the conception of what is not affected 
by cognitions at all. (CP 5.525)
You may not see at irst how this bears on exposing the deep confusion of Rorty’s 
reading of Dewey and of pragmatism in general, but there’s a clue there that should 
assist us in returning our conception of pragmatism to its true. (When I say, “its true” in 
this context, I intend the remark to be treated genealogically, that is, with an eye to the 
same conjectural future that Rorty, however inaptly, is guessing at.) Peirce has in mind 
Kant’s confusion about the Ding an sich and the meaning of an “independent” but not 
noumenal world: that is, the indissolubility of the metaphysical and epistemological 
(which, thus far at least, is itself a valid Kantian commitment). Peirce also has in mind 
the entire arbitrary (indemonstrable) apparatus of Kant’s transcendental reasoning, 
which obliges Kant to make substantive claims about the noumenal itself: especially 
4. I bring the account of Peirce’s fallibilism up to the more or less settled thesis of ininite Hope (which 
iddles unproductively with the use of ininitesimals), in Margolis (2012: Chapter 2). I’m pressing 
beyond that limitation here (and elsewhere).
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about the disjunction between the apriorist and the empirical that he cannot vouchsafe. 
This, precisely, is what it is to be a “confused pragmatist”.
What I see this leading to is the strategically important conjecture that the 
entire philosophical agon of our time is captured by the notion that pragmatism and 
Kantianism are irreconcilably incompatible – wherever the functional adequacy of 
Kant’s apriorism is said to be strongly separable from, and opposed to, that of the 
empirical sources of cognition (however generously construed). Indeed, an ardent and 
sizable part of contemporary philosophy is bent on recovering some form of residual 
transcendental reasoning committed to the intent of Kant’s original disjunction: 
whether involving the noumenal, necessary synthetic truths, the ineluctability of 
substantive invariances of the regulative sort, knowledge of what is real but not 
empirically accessible, or (ultimately) the rigor of Parmenidean thought. (I offer 
in evidence the views of igures like Cassirer, Habermas, McDowell, Korsgaard, 
possibly Rawls, possibly Brandom, quarrelsomely Davidson and Hempel).
I must add to this the very large – admittedly contentious – claim that the entire 
thrust of pragmatism is (or is bound to be increasingly) to repudiate anything more 
or less congruent with the Kantian notion of the synthetic a priori or anything in the 
way of strictly necessary or exceptionlessly universal or assuredly essentialist truths 
about the world – in a sense primarily addressed to metaphysical, epistemological, 
or methodological issues. The point is that Kant was quite splendid in exposing 
the indefensible rationalist and dogmatist invariances of his own world, but failed, 
egregiously, to disallow their resurgence (ingeniously altered) in his own philosophy.
The drift of modern and contemporary philosophy – progress, if you insist – is 
bent on defeating the inal vestiges of Kantianism (and its allies in this regard). The 
plain fact is that even the brief picture of Dewey’s thesis and testing (faute de mieux) 
the adequacy of lux over invariance in the indissoluble unity of epistemology and 
metaphysics that I’ve provided shows, unmistakably, that it would be impossible to 
accommodate any literal version of the Kantian a priori within Dewey’s account. 
I have, separately, tried to show that, although Peirce was indeed entangled (through 
most of his life) with some form of Kantian aspiration, he avoided any explicit 
apriorism by virtue of his doctrine of ininite Hope – which, I’m now persuaded, is 
(and was) a failed concession to an “Idealist” commitment that he began (dawningly) 
to replace, very probably under the effect of pondering Josiah Royce’s criticism of 
his ininitist fallibilism and his (seemingly more moderate) late reading of the intent 
of Dewey’s argument (though there’s every reason to believe Peirce was as much 
appalled by Dewey’s weakness in matters of logic and science as he was by what he 
took to be James’s conceptual carelessness). None of this is touched on by Rorty or 
by those Rorty inluenced, though I think it would be entirely reasonable to regard 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger at least as open to treating the complexities of human 
knowledge and understanding as harboring puzzles that could not yield to the Kantian 
account of judgment. This part of the argument needs to be supplied.
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II
I’m persuaded that the tale I’ve been pursuing has a deeper import that Rorty is 
perfectly aware of but obscures. I cannot see how Rorty’s repudiation of canonical 
philosophy – preeminently epistemology and metaphysics (and what, favoring “linguistic 
philosophy”, provides the conceptual fuse of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) – 
could possibly have been judged plausible at all, except in terms of the ineluctability of 
the so-called self-refuting paradoxes of the ininite regress of the epistemological search 
for the ultimate grounds of evidentiary objectivity. Kant is quite conident (in the irst 
Critique) that the regress is “vicious” only for the “stupid” who do not grasp the force 
of Kant’s own transcendental solution: which, of course, quite incidentally, exposes the 
dilemma confronting clever “Kantians” tempted to “aposteriorize” the a priori (along 
such lines as have attracted igures like Cassirer and C.  I. Lewis). Kant believes he’s 
outstripped skepticism by his own devices. Rorty, who is a skeptic (at least in the Greek 
sense), treats Kant’s epistemology as one of the exemplars of epistemology’s inevitable 
failure. But, as far as I can see, Rorty never demonstrates that the self-referential 
paradoxes of epistemology – which I’m entirely willing to concede – count, for that 
reason, as disallowing epistemology as such! What I see, rather, is that Kant’s apriorist 
reading of his own “Copernican revolution” is intended to defeat the vulnerabilities 
allegedly generated by the epistemological question.
It’s true, of course, that Kant was unable to conirm the validity of his apriorist 
method – hence, unable to defeat the concession that a relexive epistemological 
skepticism was inescapable. But if we concede that the force of that linkage already 
belongs to Kant’s transcendental reading of “irst philosophy”, then it becomes 
entirely reasonable to consider that the paradoxes may also be epistemologically 
benign: that is, perfectly compatible with the continued pursuit of epistemological 
issues5. To my eye, this is the only possible (and plausible) resolution that does not 
scuttle epistemology completely.
Here, a double lesson suggests itself: irst, that Dewey’s argument (in Logic and 
Experience and Nature) heeds the lesson of Kant’s “Copernican” revolution, that is, 
Kant’s prioritizing epistemology over metaphysics even as Kant renders epistemology 
and metaphysics inseparable and effectively retires any and all readings of rationalism 
and dogmatic philosophy, including his own; and, second, that Dewey (also, Peirce, 
though along different lines) captures an essential piece of the pragmatist argument 
that turns Kant’s “therapeutic” strategy against Kant’s own apriorist variant, though, 
now, under the colors of a broadly “Darwinian” treatment of “primary experience”, 
which also conirms Peirce’s verdict that Kant is, inally, a “confused pragmatist”, 
whether or not he could have anticipated the ineliminably inchoate features of human 
cognition and understanding.
5. Here, I’m persuaded that Barry Stroud’s excellent relections on the benign standing of the skeptical 
challenge (that is, that [Greek] skepticism probably cannot be completely defeated by any second-
order strategy, but [also] need not be defeated, if philosophical inquiry is to remain viable) conirms 
the reasonableness of taking skepticism and epistemology to be entirely compatible. See Stroud 2000.
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The decisive consideration points to pragmatism’s future: both Dewey and Peirce, 
in different ways, are drawn to the “empirical” (the Darwinian and post-Darwinian) 
need to recognize that the analysis of knowledge (a fortiori, of science and practical 
know-how) cannot fail to acknowledge the bio-cultural dependence of all discursively 
explicit processes of discovery, conjecture, inference, interpretation, judgment, 
conirmation and the like on unknown, inchoate, tacit, vague, indeterminate, 
organismic, inexplicit but undoubtedly actual factors needed to gain the exemplary 
successes of any explicit system of science or practical know-how. So epistemology 
is undoubtedly insuperably informal and conceptually incomplete.
Accordingly, I treat Dewey’s efforts at sketching the holist range of his use of 
“experience” (already briely summarized) as heuristic (or mythic) attempts to 
recover the profoundly conjectural, passing, constructivist nature of what we should 
mean by cognition and relexive understanding (which extends, in Dewey, to what he 
himself calls “noncognitive” – itself a misleading characterization – also “organic” 
or “organismic”. Peirce, I’m prepared to argue – and have argued, elsewhere – 
approaches the matter more perspicuously through a strategy that (I believe) he began 
to see the full force of only dawningly, toward the end of his life – in what I call his 
“abductive turn”.
This is not the right occasion to explore Peirce’s strategy. But perhaps I may say that 
(as I see matters) Royce (who is vulnerable enough in the defense of his own theories) 
does effectively expose the paradoxical “Idealism” of Peirce’s ininitist fallibilism 
(the need for an “absolute” cognizing agent, to make sense of the pragmatist force 
of the fallibilist formula itself). Peirce seems to stonewall on the issue; but he does 
also turn slowly but surely to the remarkable economies of the abductive turn, as 
well as (I surmise) to the intent of Dewey’s line of reasoning, which (as I say) also 
focuses on the inexplicit, even nondiscursive features of judgment (that is, of what 
would be inexplicable in terms of what Kant calls “judgment”), construed as inally 
determinate, or determinately analyzable.
It’s Kant’s insistent advocacy of the conceptual transparency of discursive 
judgment (as both cognizing process and cognitive achievement) that falls to the 
pragmatist rejoinder (a conjunction, at its best, of Deweyan and Peircean counter-
proposals). It’s easy enough to see that if the strictest transcendental resources remain 
unsecured (neither defended nor defensible), then if the Darwinian-inspired analysis 
of cognition (à la Dewey and Peirce) obliges us to admit the profoundly conjectural 
nature of cognition itself (quite apart from the challenge of skepticism and regress 
arguments), then, for one thing, pragmatism will have gained the right to claim to 
have advanced an early (but entirely reasonable) “inal” resolution of the question of 
Kantian apriorism and of all similarly privileged (discursively, completely articulable) 
forms of science and practical understanding; and, for a second, we will have made 
a great advance against the presumption that epistemology must rest on some form 
of necessary synthetic truths (unconditional invariances, essences, and the like). For 
example, we should be able (as we already are) to be entirely hospitable to arguments 
that reject the need for invariant and exceptionless “laws of nature”6.
6. For illustrative purposes, see Cartwright 1983 and 1999.
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You cannot fail to see that, thus construed, the pragmatist argument – already 
among its classic igures, but insuficiently noticed there – bids fair to reverse the 
pendulum of Western philosophy, from Parmenides on, through Kant’s “revolution”, 
down to our own day. There’s the sense in which the agon involving pragmatism 
and Kant (and the Kantians) proves to be more than a local skirmish. It argues the 
complete reversal of the main thrust of Western philosophy through the whole of its 
history, proceeding step by step from Plato’s and Aristotle’s essential compromise 
with Parmenides down to Kant’s ingenious (but inherently lawed) effort to secure 
the main lines of Plato’s compromise, suited, by altogether novel means, to Kant’s 
defeat of what he took to be the then-reigning models of invariance and certitude: 
the continuum, now, of the explicitly cognitive and of what remains (and may, in 
some measure, always remain) incompletely discernible (ineliminable) in cognitional 
processes. It argues the essential informality of epistemology (a fortiori, of metaphysics 
and methodology), which need not (to be sure) be read as disallowing the would-be 
perceived “necessities” of any explicitly discursive analysis of science and practical 
understanding. (Cassirer’s treatment of the need for “regulative” necessities – bearing 
on modern physics – provides a knockdown example.7) But it also means that 
Dewey defeats Rorty “textually” – that Rorty does not see the deeper objective of the 
pragmatist movement. I should add that many who are sympathetic to the pragmatist 
cause (very possibly including the Peirce of ininitist fallibilism, but not Dewey 
himself, in spite of widespread dissatisfaction with Dewey’s mode of argument)8 have 
failed to grasp the radical possibilities of the “Darwinian” thrust of its best forays. 
(They regularly chide Rorty, but they have also failed to grasp how completely Rorty 
has failed to fathom pragmatism itself. This inding has another application that I shall 
come to shortly).
III
I must add, in closing, several bits of loosely linked arguments that would require 
a considerable run of space to be joined properly to the discussion just completed. The 
one decisive issue I’ve all but omitted concerns Peirce’s abductive turn. My sense is 
that it’s Peirce’s rather than Dewey’s treatment of the inexplicit – more exactly, the 
incompletely explicable – nature of cognition (Peirce’s notion of abductive “guesses” 
at fruitful lines of inquiry and argument) that is likely to provide the essential nerve of 
the ultimate defeat of Kant’s all-too discursive treatment of judgment and its executive 
role in science and understanding9. Post-Darwin, the analysis of cognition (together 
with the self-referential paradoxes of epistemology) is bound to yield to vagueness 
7. See Cassirer (1957: 475-479).
8. For an up-to-date specimen, see the running account of Dewey’s contribution, in Misak 2013.
9. Quite unexpectedly, the argument counts decisively against John McDowell’s attempt to revive a 
very strong form of the discursivity account of perceptual knowledge, in McDowell’s Woodbridge 
Lectures. See McDowell (2009, Part I). I’ve presented my analysis of Peirce’s treatment of abduction 
(still unpublished) in a symposium commemorating the centennial of Peirce’s death, in March 2014, 
at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Denver, Colorado.
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and indiscernibility. But my present purpose is to give no more than a hint of the larger 
scope of the argument I’ve broached.
First, then, an addition to the assessment of Rorty’s philosophical contribution as a 
pragmatist critic of classic pragmatism and general philosophy; and, second, a better 
sense of the problematic nature of Davidson’s “linguistic method”. Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature represents the high point of Rorty’s commitment to the seeming 
adequacy of the form of “linguistic philosophy” he once championed, chiely in the 
company (and somewhat risky tutelage) of Donald Davidson – on the assumption 
of the separability of “grammatical” and “epistemological” analyses: the so-called 
“pure” and “impure” forms of linguistic philosophy – practiced, disjunctively (so 
Rorty would have us believe) by Davidson and Hilary Putnam respectively. (Rorty 
signals his allegiance to Wilfrid Sellars as well, to the extent that Sellars’s studies 
can be drawn in Davidson’s purist direction.) The fact is, Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature is itself the expression of an actual philosophical practice, though Rorty’s 
conclusions belie the fact10.
The point to bear in mind is that Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s epistemology is 
premised on his (Rorty’s) adherence to something akin to Davidson’s “pure” version 
of linguistic philosophy. My rejoinder to all this is simply that, for one thing, Rorty 
goes astray regarding the would-be disjunction, quite apart from the import of 
Davidson’s utterly surprising essay, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, which, taken 
literally, completely repudiates the possibility of any formalized version of linguistic 
philosophy along the lines of the Quinean, Tarskian, and Hempelian cast of Davidson’s 
early papers on language11. That there is not, and cannot be, any such disjunction in 
Davidson’s oeuvre follows directly from any cursory reading of Davidson’s papers, 
“Radical Interpretation” and “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”.
Beyond a clariication of Davidson’s actual views, we must also, thirdly, bear in 
mind that Rorty himself, after having published the very carefully organized collection, 
The Linguistic Turn (1967), which does not include any of Davidson’s papers, 
repudiates the entire undertaking, in his “Twenty-Five Years After” piece, which he 
includes in the 1992 second edition of the collection. Here, without comment (or the 
need for comment), is Rorty’s confession of the utter collapse of the very idea of a 
“philosophy of language” – hence, therefore, the collapse of the distinction between 
“pure” and “impure” philosophy of language, hence (also) the ground for the critique 
(or misreading) of Dewey’s treatment of “experience”, hence then as well Rorty’s 
distortion of the entire thrust of pragmatism:
10. The center of Rorty’s discussion of these matters, which counts as the second focus of the 1979 
book (the irst focus appears in Chapter 4) appears in Chapter 6.
11. Davidson’s “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” appeared originally in LePore 1986. Rorty’s own 
(well-known) paper in the same collection, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth”, is a strenuous attempt 
to present Davidson’s “purism” as a pioneer form of pragmatism, which (in fact) Rorty brings to bear 
on both Dewey and Peirce – more congenially (but inaccurately) on Dewey as anticipating Davidson. 
See, especially, Rorty’s “pragmatist” summary of Davidson’s commitment (1979: 335). This, of course, 
“explains” Rorty’s “advice” to Dewey to abandon the notion of “experience” in favor of “discourse”, 
by the time of the 1979 book.
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The idea that philosophical problems can be dissolved by detecting the “logic of our 
language” already seemed to me, in 1965, untenable. But I was still, alas, attached to 
the idea that there was something called “linguistic method in philosophy”. I now ind 
it impossible to isolate such a method – to specify a procedure of inquiry (a “logical” 
or “linguistic” as opposed to a “phenomenological” or “ontological” procedure) which 
distinguishes a late Wittgenstein from early Heidegger or Davidson’s Inquiries into 
Truth and Interpretation from Dewey’s Experience and Nature.12
I think it not in the least unreasonable to take the original advocacy of the “linguistic 
turn” as Rorty’s inal attempt to advance a minimalist view of canonical philosophy; 
with its repudiation, Rorty turns to what has been called his “postmodern” pragmatist 
extreme. But then the new vision is no more than an autobiographical confession: it 
completely lacks an argument. Now, it also happens that Davidson’s extraordinarily 
direct, uncompromising attack on Quine’s extremely inluential thesis, known as 
“radical translation”, which, in my opinion, is decidedly problematic – though not for 
the reason Davidson advances – is itself (I mean, Davidson’s substitute thesis, which 
he calls “radical interpretation”, in a 1983 article identically thus titled) demonstrably 
incoherent13.
That Quine’s thesis is both defective and question begging, that Davidson’s 
counterproposal is incoherent, that Rorty’s own venture with the philosophy of 
language came to seem to Rorty himself to be utterly lacking in philosophical purpose, 
constitute a remarkable state of affairs: if true, then surely we face a philosophical 
collapse of a very large sort. But what I want to make clear is that, bearing in mind 
Davidson’s run of papers in the philosophy of language, Rorty’s best-known efforts, 
in embracing Davidson’s version of the “linguistic method in philosophy”, are: (a) ill-
advised, (b) inaccurately characterized, (c) incompatible with the putative disjunction 
between the “pure” and “impure” forms of linguistic method, (d) impossible to be 
shown to be coherent or viable, and (e) mortally challenged by Davidson himself. 
I can’t think of a comparable disaster in Anglo-American pragmatism, analytic 
philosophy, or “analytic pragmatism” during the second half of the twentieth century 
and a little more than the irst decade of the new century. But it more than suggests the 
need for a review of all of Rorty’s philosophical appraisals, and a reassessment of our 
true philosophical prospects from here on out.
If  Davidson was right to read Quine’s thesis as a petitio (I’d say he was right), though 
the solution offered in “Radical Interpretation” is incoherent – where Quine, despite 
being seriously mistaken, cannot be said to have advanced an incoherent position – 
and if the essential thesis of Davidson’s paper (and of the rest of the pertinent papers 
in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation) do not sustain any disjunction between 
a “grammatical” and an “epistemological” treatment of language, then objections 
(a)-(d), against Rorty, will have been suitably addressed. We would see at once that 
12. Richard Rorty, “Twenty-Five Years After”, in Rorty (1992: 373); see, also, Rorty’s original “Intro-
duction”.
13. See Davidson 2000. Davidson blunts the charge rather deftly but without effect (2000: 129n3), 
since the force of his own account is that Quine’s thesis is a petitio. Quine’s thesis appears in Quine 
(1960: Chapter 2).
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the mischief of Rorty’s analyses of philosophical arguments extended to much more 
than pragmatism narrowly construed. In fact, the collapse of Davidson’s program of 
linguistic analysis may be even more worrisome, precisely because Davidson (quite 
correctly) intends his own work to be read as committed to canonical philosophical 
objectives. Very possibly, the most important paper in the Inquiries volume, “On 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974), is, I’m prepared to say (but won’t 
argue the matter here) based on a demonstrably mistaken reading of Thomas Kuhn’s 
immensely disputed notion of a “paradigm shift”, though through it all Rorty’s (as 
well as Davidson’s and Sellars’s) “linguistic method” ranges freely, without special 
provisions of any sort or any division between “pure” and “unpure” considerations. 
The charge of item (e), which marks a fundamental change in Davidson’s speculations 
about language, appears in a novel (but completely autonomous) way in “A Nice 
Derangement of Epitaphs”, though the paper is not included in the Inquiries volume 
and cannot be treated as “postmodern” in Rorty’s way (though Rorty’s and Davidson’s 
“methods” overlap in spite of that).
These remarks about Davidson’s “linguistic method” have, admittedly, very 
little to do with the right analysis of Dewey’s pragmatism, except that Davidson’s 
account of “radical interpretation” is (and may be seen at once to be) unconditionally 
incompatible with any plausible form of pragmatism. (This is emphatically not true of 
Quine’s problematic notion of “radical translation”.) Furthermore, Rorty’s elevation 
of Davidson, as very possibly the single most important “pragmatist” voice among the 
cohort following Dewey’s death (to include igures like Quine, Sellars, Putnam, Kuhn, 
and, much later, Brandom) betrays the unreliability (possibly, the sheer opportunism) 
of Rorty’s appraisal of these admittedly important igures. Rorty, I suggest, obliges us 
to pause long enough to consider what rightly serves to deine the pragmatism of our 
own day: it must yield ground in the direction, say, of Wittgenstein and even Carnap, 
but (I would say) nothing in favor of Davidson’s “method”.
I regard the following line of reasoning to capture the essential premise of 
Davidson’s “radical interpretation” thesis – and to betray, at the same time, its utter 
incoherence:
radical interpretation, is supposed to supply an understanding of particular utterances 
that is not given in advance, so the ultimate evidence for the theory cannot be correct 
sample interpretations. To deal with the general case, the evidence must be of the 
sort that would be available to someone who does not already know how to interpret 
utterances the theory is designed to cover: it must be evidence that can be stated without 
essential use of such linguistic concepts as meaning, interpretation, synonymy, and the 
like.14
The truth, I venture to say, is just the reverse of what Davidson claims here! (But 
the supporting argument and rationale are needed.) Davidson inds (correctly) that 
Quine’s “radical translation” thesis favors construing the apparent verbal behavior 
of an alien speaker in terms of our own language. But how can we conirm that we 
14. Davidson (2000: 128). See the heroic effort to recover Davidson’s thesis, in LePore and Ludwig 
2005, considered in the light of their verdict in the inal paragraph: “impossible” (424). 
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know the meaning of the counters of our own language? Here, Davidson has no wish 
to deny that apt speakers do know their native language: it’s only that we must ask 
ourselves how, in principle, can we show that we understand the meaning of our 
words? The answer, according to Davidson’s scruple, is that the evidence must be 
drawn entirely from behavioral data that do not draw (in any way) on “correct sample 
interpretations” (of linguistic meaning) – because to proceed thus would be to proceed 
by petitio.
Davidson is right, of course. Nevertheless, he is urging the impossible. The 
counterargument does not depend on either the “pure” or “impure” strategies Davidson 
lays out: it depends, rather, on the preconditions of either or both, if either or both is 
viable at all. And, of course, the intent of the argument overrides the fatal disjunction 
Rorty has put his trust in: it presupposes, irst, that if the originating question makes 
sense (it does make sense), then there must be a valid answer to the question (which 
is either an equivocal judgment or demonstrably incapable of relieving the original 
petitio). That’s to say: the question cannot be answered without drawing us back to the 
puzzles of Kant’s “revolution” of irst philosophy, which appear (thus transformed) as 
the self-referential paradoxes of epistemology.
The solution I favor accepts, you will recall, the benign compatibility of 
skepticism and the effective resolution of the epistemological paradoxes – on the 
premise that, post-Darwin, evidence of a suitable form of cultural immersion is the 
only conceivable way of providing evidence of linguistic mastery. But that of course 
disallows any solution of Davidson’s sort: the admission of the unique, artifactual 
invention (and subsequent serial mastery of language among the infant members of 
the species) provides the normally adequate (effective) evidence of our knowledge of 
meanings. My own line of argument holds that, on the paleoanthropological evidence, 
the original invention and serial mastery of language is the verso of the artifactual 
formation of the human “person” or “self”, the self-transformed human primate, the 
fully functional human subject or agent, whose very existence is inseparable from the 
societal sharing of a language15.
Hence, in one stroke, we glimpse the impoverishment of both Davidson’s and 
Rorty’s philosophical programs; an essential contribution to the defeat of Kant’s own 
premise in favor of the necessity of a transcendental solution to the epistemological 
question; the dawning signiicance of Dewey’s and Peirce’s attenuation of the theory 
of knowledge along the lines of the tacit, the indeterminate, the thoroughly luxive, the 
informal, the inexplicitly organismic, the inchoate; and the natural advantage (contra 
Kantian and analogous necessities) of the deepest pragmatist strategies. Apparently, 
there is no place for such conjectures in either Davidson or Rorty (pace Davidson’s 
“A Nice Derangement” and Rorty’s “Twenty-Five Years After”). We cannot fail to see 
that both neglect the obvious way out.
The reductio of Davidson’s thesis (in “Radical Interpretation”) may be put this 
way: on the Darwinian and post-Darwinian paleoanthropological evidence, “natural 
language” is itself a contingent cultural invention of Homo sapiens. To admit the 
15. For a brief glimpse of the theory of persons, see Margolis (2012: Chapter 3).
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fact is to admit the need for a novel form of evolution – to accommodate the non-
standard features of the human career: the hybrid intertwining of the biological 
and the cultural; the uniquely complex, specialized neural circuitry of the human 
brain (suited to the gradual invention, societally reliable transmission, and socially 
enabled individual acquisition, of language itself); the paradoxically helpless, totally 
dependent, prematurely birthed, evolutionarily ill-adapted, possibly even regressively 
disadvantaged, post-natal biological development of the infant primate members of 
the species; the remarkably acute, compensatory sociability and aptness for social play 
and speciically encultured (and enlanguaged) learning on the part of human infants; 
and the effective identity of the double Bildung involving language, namely, that of 
the longitudinal invention (over an immensity of time) of true language and the serial 
mastery of language by successive cohorts of primate infants; and the transformation 
(the self-transformation) of the primate members of Homo sapiens into functional 
selves or persons.
In effect, the thesis of the hybrid artifactuality of persons is (in my opinion) the most 
plausible account of the prehistorically dated cultural achievement of the invention and 
functional luency of human speech that we possess. I emphasize the inseparability 
of our understanding the unique features of speech and language and their biological 
and cultural sources: because, in that way, we are led to grasp the full force of the 
premise that we cannot possibly explain our understanding the meaning of what we 
say (in speaking a language) except in terms of the unique forms of cultural immersion 
by means of which the trick is turned! We literally cannot suppose that linguistic 
competence and understanding speech can be conirmed (the gist of Davidson’s 
challenge to Quine) by any form of behavioral, animal, or machine intelligence that 
is not itself suitably informed linguistically. The achievement of language depends on 
capacities (that are themselves culturally acquired) that, though materially enabled 
(normally by means of conventionally ordered sounds and gestures) are said to yield 
“meaningful”, transformed counters (words and sentences, as we say) – counters 
capable of “conveying meanings” – that only human persons (or suitable surrogates) 
can rightly manifest. Philosophically, the emergence of language appears to provide 
the best evidence against every known form of physical reductionism.
There’s room here for any sort of theoretical ine-tuning that may be needed. We 
signal the uniqueness and irreducibility of the linguistic to any other form of meaningful 
communication by its functional features – say, by reference to its “symbolic” and 
“symbolizing” structure (as, for instance, in accord with Peirce’s semiotic or something 
akin). But, if conceded, then Davidson’s proposal will be seen to be incoherent – in 
supposing that linguistic meaning can be captured by behavioral (or other) resources 
that, however “meaningful”, utterly lack language’s unique way of conveying meaning. 
If you concede all that, then you must also see how impossible it becomes to deny 
that the self-referential paradoxes of our claim to understand linguistic meaning (or to 
know what knowledge is, or to conirm, reliably, that we know what we claim to know 
about language and the world) must be benignly circular and benignly vulnerable to 
skeptical challenge. There’s the evidence that the distinctive doctrines of Davidson, 
Rorty, and Kant regarding knowledge are latly indefensible.
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I have a last bit to add. I cited, early on, a passage from Dewey in which he 
speaks of “the large and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments [and the 
like] together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics and religion”. 
I take Dewey to be saying, here, that his sort of pragmatism makes pointed provision 
for all the existential concerns that belong to the “logic of inquiry”, in the sense in 
which inquiry takes precedence over canonical logic or science, but in the sense 
(also) in which the theorizing concerns of art, science, and practical life equally 
belong to the primary concerns of “inquiry” – in fact, the sense in which, without 
the existential linkage between the “two” sorts of involvement mentioned, any 
concern that “sufferings and enjoyments” will be appropriately served may not be 
effectively satisied. Both Dewey and Peirce are absorbed (in very different ways) 
with the continuum of inquiry. I’m persuaded that our grasp of the artifactuality of 
the human person (the hybrid, biologically and culturally ramiied emergence of 
the human person) is, in fact, the single most important conceptual discovery about 
human life itself (including our understanding human sufferings and enjoyments); so 
that, for many reasons, there cannot be any effective priority between the existentialia 
of human feelings and those of our relexive conception of the human condition itself!
I mention the effective inseparability, philosophically, between human 
“experience” (however parsed) and an adequate conception of human experience, 
because of a rather odd (but well-meant) criticism – adventitiously directed against 
me (which, if valid, would serve in a perfectly freestanding way). The charge appears 
in a review by Douglas Browning, of an earlier book of mine, Historied Thought, 
Constructed World (1995), written without speciic reference to Dewey’s Logic and 
Experience and Nature (though certainly inluenced by pragmatist inclinations). 
I mention Browning’s review because it makes a very strong claim about the proprieties 
of “where” one “begins” (or should begin) – where one “enters” the discussion, so to 
say – in beginning a responsible philosophical afirmation, and because it has been 
seconded by qualiied readers loyal to pragmatist concerns. Here is Browning’s charge:
To start with symbiosis [that’s to say, with my advocacy of the indissoluble unity of 
metaphysics and epistemology], even holistically understood, is to start with a theory, 
and to start with a theory is to start by assuming a certain cognitive privilege. But 
Dewey is as insistent as Margolis that no such privilege is warranted. Dewey’s starting 
point is pre-theoretical; Margolis’s is not.16
16. Browning (1997: 183). I’m persuaded that Browning’s charge deserves an answer, partly at least 
because David Hildebrand has pressed the need for an answer, in several papers, both without and 
with reference to my own way of proceeding. See Hildebrand 2011. Hildebrand refers to Dewey’s 
“starting point” as “noncognitive” (53): he means that Dewey begins with the “stuff” of “primary 
experience”, that is, of “experience” that is not captured by prior, so-to-say already antecedently 
“inished” theories. I see the intended distinction clearly enough. But I don’t see how the “givenness” 
of primary experience (in the sense intended) is not, also, a theoretical posit of “something” intended to 
be not theoretically structured by any antecedent theory! Browning speaks of this as “pre-theoretical”. 
I have no dificulty with the claim, but I must insist that it requires (and is inseparable from) a 
theorizing provision that what it “denotes” is “pre-theoretical”! Now if that’s admitted, then I don’t see 
how the force of Browning’s charge can be made to depend on the fact that I support the “symbiosis” 
of metaphysics and epistemology; or to deny that what is “denoted” (in Dewey’s special sense) as 
“pre-theoretical” is (also) robustly posited by an initial theory. I also don’t see how the descriptive 
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I’m afraid I ind Browning’s charge to be either irrelevant or entirely caught 
up in a fruitless equivocation. I see no dificulty in conceding that one may posit 
(by way of a sympathetic theory) a “pre-theoretical” – an uncognized but organismically 
“suffered” – state or feeling, unqualiied by any antecedently posited theory on which 
its characterization depends. But if one goes this far, then, I suggest, one must have the 
courage to oppose the idea that we can assuredly provide the accurate characterization 
of that “given”; for, otherwise, that “given” will not fail to be privileged. (My 
suggestion is that Dewey must be speaking heuristically – or “mythically” – here.)
Consider a loose analogy: logical theory, applied to the analysis of natural-
language sentences, posits, benignly, the existence of atomic sentences; but it cannot 
provide an instance of a natural-language atomic sentence, though it makes use of 
the idea in all its pertinent applications. Browning, I’m afraid, has missed the point 
of Dewey’s thesis. Davidson can’t be a pragmatist, inasmuch as he champions 
the executive claim of “Radical Interpretation”. But he could have abandoned the 
idea. And Rorty was a “confused pragmatist” at best, during the time he believed 
Davidson’s “linguistic method of philosophy” (which relied on the force of essays like 
“Radical Interpretation” and “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”) constituted a 
pragmatist advance of the irst rank. I don’t see the relevance of Browning’s argument 
in my own case.
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